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common shareholder, entitled to a part of all dividends and assets distributed to
the common stock. Yet part of this new interest has been acquired at the expense of the interests formerly represented by the preferred stock; for the preferred must now share all distributions with a larger class of common shares.
Each preferred share now represents a smaller proportionate interest in any
excess distributions over and above the amount of its preference. Consequently
this is a case in which the shareholder undoubtedly does receive an increased
proportionate interest in the corporation; but in which the new interest is only
partially distinct from the former interest. The new certificate represents
partly gain secured at the expense of the common shareholders, and partly the
old interest in excess distributions. It seems impossible to say, consistently with
the Eisner case, that the new shares of common stock received by the holder of
participating preferred represent a gain derived from the capital, severed from
the original capital interest; yet it seems impractical to allow a stockholder to
escape taxation on a new and valuable property interest merely because it is
imperfectly dissociated from his original capital. As Mr. Justice Holmes said
in his dissent in Eisnerv. Macomber, the purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment
was to get rid of nice questions of this kind.44

PROHIBITING REFUNDS OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAXES*
Under the authority of the unconstitutional Agricultural Adjustment Act,'
the Internal Revenue Bureau collected processing taxes of approximately a
billion dollars.2 At the time the act was passed the statutory and common law
provided for refunds of unconstitutionally-collected taxes regardless of whether
or not the tax had been shifted to consumers, 3 and there was no general proand also io,ooo shares of common stock. Suppose that in a given year the earnings are $275,ooo, and that these are distributed in cash. The preferred will receive its $5 per share and
$2o extra; and the common likewise will receive $25. But suppose that in 5 successive years
the directors issue the preferred dividends in common stock and make no further distributions.
Now the same $275,000 will be distributed, $5 per share and $13.75 extra; but the share of
each preferred shareholder, holding one preferred and 5 common, will be $5 and $107.5o extra.
The share of the preferred stock has been reduced in the ratio of 25.0 to 18.75; but the share
of the preferredshareholderhas been increased in the ratio of 112.5 to 25.0. The preferred shareholder would make a similar gain with respect to share in the assets on dissolution, or book
value.
44 252 U.S. 189, 220 (1920).

* For related problems see Field, The Recovery of Illegal and Unconstitutional Taxes, 45
Harv. L. Rev. 5oi (1932).
'48 Stat. 31 (I933); 7 U.S.C.A. § 6oi et seq. (1936), hereafter referred to as the AAA. It
was held unconstitutional in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. i (1936).
14 Tax Mag. io8 (i936).
3 U.S. Rev. Stats. § 3220 (1878); 45 Stat. 996 (1928); 26 U.S.C.A. § 1670(a) (1) (1935). See
notes 14 and x5 infra.
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vision in the AAA altering this rule.4 More than two years later, however, Congress passed § 21 (d) of the AAA amendment, providing that "No refund ....
shall be made of ....
any tax ....
which accrued before, on, or after [the
date of the amendment] ....
unless ....
it shall be established ... . to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ....
that neither the
claimant nor any person ....
under his control ....
passed on any part of

such amount ..... "
,s Section 21 (d), eliminating numerous existing causes of
action against the government and its collectors on taxes paid before the
amendment, will probably be contested before the Supreme Court as unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.a
Except for United States v. Jefferson ElectricMfg. Co. ' no Supreme Court cases
have been found involving a limitation of refunds on taxes paid before the
limiting statute was passed. In the Jefferson case taxes were paid on the sale
of automobile parts later held not to be within the terms of the tax law. A
statute, passed after these payments, forbade refunds unless the tax was not
shifted, putting the burden of proof on the taxpayer. In suits against both the
government and its collectors the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Van Devanter, held the statute constitutional almost without discussion. "If
the taxpayer has borne the burden of the tax, he readily can show it;. .... ,7
In the light of this decision the Court has three courses open to it in the processing tax cases: (i) to distinguish the Jefferson case; (2) to reexamine its
premises and conclude that they are unsound; or (3) to agree with it and hold
the amendments of the AAA constitutional.
The differences between the present cases and the Jefferson case are not
extensive. There the tax was upon manufactured single items, here upon
quantities of fungible goods; but this is of no apparent importance. There the
tax was upon sales by sales unit, here upon an operation by units which bear
a less obvious relationship to the sales unit; and the processors rely heavily upon
this difference as increasing the improbability of accurate proof of non-shifting.
Finally, there the illegal act was merely overassessment by a collector, here
passage of an unconstitutional act by the Congress; and it may be that the
Court will wish to encourage thorough collection by the collectors while discouraging the passage of unconstitutional statutes. These differences, however,
4 There are provisions for specific limited refunds, as for example, where the processed
goods were sold for charitable purposes. 48 Stat. 39, 973 (1933); 7 U.S.C.A. § 6x5 (5) (c)

(1936); see also §§ 615 (a), 616 (a) (2), 617 (a) of the same title.
5 49 Stat. 770 (1935); 7 U.S.C.A. § 623 (d) (1936). This section was substantially re-enacted
in § 902 of title VIE of the Revenue Act of 1936. 49 Stat. 1747 (1936); 7 U.S.C.A. § 644
(1936). Added were rules for presumption of passing-on, discussed later in this note. See note

infra and text.
sa See Lincoln Mills v. Davis, 15 F. Supp. 257 (Ala. 1936) (statute constitutional); Edwin
Cigar Co. v. Higgins, 14 F. Supp. 817 (N.Y. 1936) (unconstitutional).
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6 291 U.S. 386 (1934).
7Id. at 402.
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while useful as a pretext to avoid an express overruling, would hardly lead to a
different result if the Court really approves the decision in the Jefferson case.
In deciding upon the constitutionality of § 21 (d) under the Fifth Amendment, it is material to consider whether or not the processor has sustained any
real loss as a result of the assessment under the AAA. For statutes affecting
existing causes of action as well as for other statutes attacked under the due
process clause the fundamental constitutional inquiry has been whether or not
the plaintiff has suffered financial injury. The courts have generally phrased
their opinions, however, in terms of whether or not a cause of action existed and
whether the statute interfered with this cause of action itself or merely affected
the manner of its enforcement. It is said that while a cause of action is a vested
right, the remedy by which it is enforced is not. Hence if only vested rights are
property under the due process clause, it must follow that statutes "merely
affecting the remedy" are constitutional while statutes "impairing the case of
action" are not.' As in the numerous other rules of law in which the remedysubstance formula is used, the courts have not defined the terms but have relied
upon common sense and precedent. For example there could be little hesitation
in holding remedial a statute transferring cases involving small amounts from
the district court to a small claims court and similarly little in holding substantive one abolishing the right to recover small amounts. The latter attempts
to take something away, the former merely to regulate the method of obtaining
it. But it is clear that the result aimed at in the latter could be accomplished
by transferring all such cases to a court sitting in Hawaii or to a local court having very arduous and expensive procedure, though such a statute would in form
merely regulate the method. In other words the rule suggested, if mechanically
followed, would lead to contrary results in substantially indistinguishable cases
because of unimportant differences in the wording of the laws. For this reason
it has been contended that the rule should be that those statutes which are
reasonable are constitutional, those unreasonable, not. 9 The same result could
be reached by a recognition that remedialbears a special, very restricted meaning in this group of constitutional cases. In extreme instances the courts have
usually had little difficulty in invalidating retroactive statutes which were apparently remedial but which really injured prospective litigants.1°
In Campbell v. Holt- the United States Supreme Court held constitutional a
8 "But there is no such thing as a vested right to a particular remedy." Chief Justice Shaw
in Commonwealth v. Comm'rs of Hampden, 6 Pick. (Mass.) SoI, 5o8 (1828). See also Standifer v. Wilson, 93 Tex. 232, 54 S.W. 898 (i9oo).
9 See Smith, Retrospective Laws and Vested Rights, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 231, 247-48 (1927), and
6 Tex. L. Rev. 409 (1928), especially at 424-26; 35 Yale L. J. 478 (1926); 2 Austin, Jurispru-

dence 856 (5th ed. i885).
10Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & S.I.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633 (1925); Chambers v. Gallagher, 177
Cal. 704, 171 Pac. 931 (i9x8); see Willard v. Harvey, 24 N.H. 344, 354 (1852). But see Gilbert
v. Selleck, 93 Conn. 412, io6 Atl. 439 (i919); Orman v. Van Arsdell, 12 N.M. 344, 78 Pac. 48
(1904).
It IIS U.S. 620 (i885).
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retroactive law increasing the statute of limitations period, which had the effect
of reviving a cause of action between private parties previously barred. The
statute was considered remedial. In later cases in various fields the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis, continued to insist upon a rather
mechanical remedy-substance formula, and this insistence reached its peak in
Lyxhl v. United States.12 There the Congress, having passed laws providing for
insurance with the government, passed the Economy Act repealing all of these
laws. The plaintiff sued as a beneficiary under one of the policies issued, and
the government pleaded that it had withdrawn its consent to be sued. The
Court held the Economy Act a "repudiation" of the obligation, hence substantive and unconstitutional. But the dictum was clear that Congress could constitutionally have achieved the result desired merely by forbidding all courts
and administrative officers to hear the claim. This would be remedial because
13
there would still be recourse to the legislative body.
Whether the Court bases its decision on a more or less mechanical application of the remedy-substance formula or inquires primarily into the practical
effects upon the taxpayers may depend in part upon which of the possible
remedies is pursued. The causes of action which § 21 (d) is alleged to affect unconstitutionally were clearly existing prior to the passage of the amendment to
the AAA. Processors had two alternative methods of recovering the taxes illegally exacted: (i) sue the United States,14 or (2) sue the collector in his individual capacity.' s Since the amendment applied to both types of suits, either
of these actions could now be used to test its constitutionality. But since there
are no words of repudiation but merely descriptions of proofs to be required by
the commissioner, it is possible that the amendment would be called "remedial,"
in an action against the government, irrespective of the damage done the
processors. For this reason the bulk of the suits have been against the collector
in the hope that the court might here adopt the rule of reasonableness since the
dictum in the Lynch case applied only to suits against the government. After a
judgment has been obtained against a collector of internal revenue, the govern292 U.S. 57', 582 (1933). See United States v. Babcock,
Pusey & Jones v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491, 497-500 (1922).

250

U.S. 328, 331 (1919);

13 Such
r4 The

recourse is not barred by a repudiation either. It is not a right, but a privilege.
law in effect when the taxes were collected provided that "The Commissioner ....

is authorized ....
to remit ....
all taxes ....
illegally assessed ..... " U.S. Rev. Stat.
§ 3220 (1878); 14 Stat. ii (i866); 26 U.S.C.A. § i670 a (i) (1935). This is weak language to be

construed as giving a "right," but a later section clearly provides for court action against the
government when the Commissioner refuses to allow the claim. U.S. Rev. Stat. § 3226 (1878);
14 Stat. 152 (i866); 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1672-73a (1935).
IsWhite v. Hopkins, 5i F. (2d) i59 (C.C.A. 5th 1931); Holmes, Federal Income Tax 936
(1922). Section 91o of the 1936 Revenue Act abolishes the liability of the collector in his
individual capacity for the return of the AAA taxes, but processors continue to sue the collector and the federal judges ignore the provision. Being clearly substantive in language and
referring to existent causes of action, it is unconstitutional under the discussion here made unless the Court discards the notion of collector's individuality.
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ment becomes, for all practical purposes, the principal debtor. The issuance
of a "certificate of probable cause" by the trial court operates as a perpetual
stay of execution against the property of the collector and obligates the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to pay the judgment. 6 But Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the Court, has insisted that a suit against a collector is a purely
personal matter, is not in fact against the government. 7 While this is historically accurate and the reasons given are not entirely without force, it is hard
to believe that history and these reasons were the real grounds for the decision.
In effect the emphasis upon the individuality of the collector seems to spring
from a desire to protect the taxpayers by avoiding what the dictum in the Lynch
8
case sought to establish-the government's extreme freedom from liability.
If a suit against a collector is personal, the rule of sovereign's immunity does not
apply to it and recovery cannot be foreclosed by congressional action; and
further, the collector is not really injured because the administration will realize,
for political if not moral reasons, that it must play square with its collectors.
It is probable, then, that the Court will not base its decision, in a suit against a
collector, on nomenclature-"remedial" or "substantive"-but may adopt the
increasingly popular rule of reasonableness. If the proof requirements in question have the effect of depriving processors of refunds which they otherwise
would and should have received, they are unconstitutional.
But the necessity for showing that he should have received these refunds may
well prove fatal to the processor's case. There is little doubt that he was entitled to a refund under the old law. Doubtful, however, is the policy behind
such refunds. Though the action for money had and received is a common law
action, its rules are principally equitable. Recovery is denied unless the unjust
enrichment complained of was at the financial expense of the complainant.
x6For a detailed discussion of the legal relationship of the parties after the certificate is
issued, see Dunnegan v. United States, 17 Ct. Cl. 247 (r88i). See also Nixon v. United States,
18 Ct. Cl. 448 (883).
17 Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Co., 257 U.S. x (1921). Four reasons were given for denying
an action against a collector's successor in office: (i) "When the suit is begun, it cannot be
known with certainty that the.judgment will be paid out of the Treasury." This is not forceful
because the government will protect its collectors and the Commissioner is instructed to reimburse them for judgments collected against them. 45 Stat. 996 (1928); 26 U.S.C.A. § 670
(b) (1935). (2) "A stranger to an unwarranted transaction" (the successor in office) cannot be
made answerable. (3) A suit against the collector survives his death and can be revived against
his executrix. Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 6o8 (igoi). In the Patton case the contention was
merely that the action for refund was a tort action and hence that it abated on the death of
the collector. (4) A "collector may be liable for interest." Today the government is also
liable for interest. 42 Stat. 36 (1921); 28 U.S.C.A. § 284 (1928).
is For the reasons behind such an immunity see United States v. Lee, io6 U.S. 196, 206
(1882), and Dodge, How To Sue the Government, 8 Marquette L. Rev. 267, 273 (1924). The
rule, wisely or not, seems to be axiomatic and impregnable. Pelkey v. United States, 71 F.
(2d) 21, 222 (App. D.C. 1934). Congress, as well as the courts, is aware of the citizen's disability. See remarks of Senator Bankhead, 79 Cong. Rec., pt. 10, 11403 (July x8, 1935). This
immunity, however, is strictly "remedial," as the decision in the Lynch case proves. See note
I2 supra and text.
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This principle has been carried over to tax refund cases where the nominal
taxpayer is a conduit for monies paid to him merely to be repaid to the government. 9 If he did not ihfact sustain a loss by the payment he is not "in equity
and good conscience" entitled to a refund. The government will probably contend that the Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed on the assumption that
the processor would not pay the tax but would pass the burden on to his vendee,
and that in most cases the price of processed goods was indeed increased by
substantially the amount of the tax.2 0 Hence he is a mere "conduit" and has no
cause for complaint. But while increased price necessarily involves increased
burden on the consumer, it does not necessarily involve decreased burden on the
processor. If the price charged was increased, the amount sold must also have
decreased to some extent, and since the unit profit was not increased, the total
profits must have decreased in proportion to the drop in sales. How much
financial burden the processor actually bore in any particular instance is extremely difficult if not impossible to ascertain with any precision.21 The ability
to "shift" a tax tends to vary inversely with the degree of monopoly, 22 the
elasticity of demand, the difference in efficiency between marginal and average
producers,23 and to vary directly with the elasticity of supply. Other variables
which must be taken into account are quality of the product, seasonal and
secular trends, credit terms and discounts, the general market and the market
in related industries. Processors argue that since it is impossible to assess
numerical values to these factors, § 21 (d) set up an impossible condition and
19See Richardson Lubricating Co. v. Kinney, 337 Iii. 122, i68 N.E. 886 (x929). Though
Van Antwerp v. State, 218 N.Y. 422, 113 N.E. 497 (r916), contra, has not been overruled by
the New York Court of Appeals, it has been criticised and ignored in other jurisdictions.
, .0
...when Congress was considering the subject of processing taxes, it was very well
understood that such taxes would be passed on to the consumer .... I assert that the processor who did not pass on the tax on the goods he sold is an incompetent business man .......
Senator Murphy in 79 Cong. Rec., pt. 10, r1458 (July 19, 1935).
21See E. R. A. Seligman, Shifting and Incidence of Taxation, especially at 338-55 (3d ed.
1gIo); Fagan, Tax Shifting and the Laws of Cost, 47 Quart. J. Econ. 68o, 691 ff. (I933).
- Since an increase in variable expense does not change the point of maximum net profit,
a monopolist, who charges the price which nets him the greatest profit, will not change his
price because of the imposition of an excise tax, a variable expense. The profit, then, will be
decreased by exactly the amount of the tax paid. Tobacco processors did not see fit to alter
their prices upon the passage of the AAA. Business Week, Jan. 18, x936, p. 7. For a discussion
of the price policy of the "Big Three" cigarette companies see Fortune, December, 1936,
especially at 158. These are monopolistic in the sense that their sales are not seriously affected
by price-cutting competition and their prices are set at the point of maximum net profit.
23If the same number of units continued to be sold, the price would be raised by the amount
of the tax since there would be the same marginal producer and his costs would be increased
by the amount of the tax. But as the price increases, the amount demanded ordinarily decreases, and the marginal producers are eliminated. Being more efficient, the new marginal
producers do not have to raise their prices by the amount of the tax and will tend to be forced
by competition not to raise them that much. As the differential in efficiency between successive marginal producers increases, the amount of necessary price-change decreases and the
decrease in profit because of the tax increases.
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left them to the arbitrary whims of the commissioner. 2 4 In amending § 21 (d)
by § 907 of the Revenue Act of 193625 Congress attempted to avoid this complaint by establishing presumptions for ascertaining whether or not a processor
passed on the tax. For instance if the processor can show that his average margin of profit per processed unit was lower during the tax period than before and
after, there is a presumption that he bore the tax to that extent. Otherwise
there is a contrary presumption. Either of these presumptions is rebuttable,
presumably by proof of such facts as change in production rate or customary
seasonal fluctuations. It must be confessed, however, that even with the presumptions the inconvenience and expense of proof are very great and yet little
better than an approximation of the processors' losses can ever be made. Profit
rates are affected by so many apparently unrelated and practically unassessable
factors that a profit change from the tax period to the no-tax period cannot be
put with any precision upon the cessation of the tax. What numerical value,
for instance, should be put upon the passage of the soldiers' bonus bill2 6 a lag
in reduction of prices after the invalidation of the tax and consequent customer
displeasure,27 or the drop in general markets because of the demise of the
8

AAA?2
Sections

21

(d) and 907, then, do take away causes of action that once existed

and do injure the processors to some extent. But if the Supreme Court adopts
the rule of reasonableness, it must find not only that holding the act constitutional will injure the processors but that holding it unconstitutional will not
cause greater injury to the public. It is generally conceded that much of the
tax was shifted.29 Since in most cases the processors' customers will have no re24 See brief of counsel for petitioner on petition for certiorariin Rickert Rice Mills v. Fontenot (297 U.S. 110 (1936)) 23-30.

Stat. 175, (1936); 7 U.S.C.A. § 649 (1936).
"However, men's wear markets became very active, when it was ascertained that congress
would override the veto on the bonus bill." Woolsley, Cotton Goods Prices Lowered to Eliminate Processing Tax, Dun & Bradstreet Monthly Review, February I936, p. 36.
27See ibid.
28In judgments on the importance of this and similar factors no precision whatever can be
attained. One measure of the farm market, Sears Roebuck & Co. sales, shows receipts of
$25,644, 816, in the four weeks ending Jan. 29, 1936, a drop of $22,400,ooo from the preceding
four weeks. The Butler decision, invalidating the AAA, was handed down on Jan. 6, 1936. A
drop is to be expected after the Christmas season, however, and these sales were i6.1 per cent
better than those of the corresponding period in 1935. But it was the largest drop since 1930
($23,5oo,ooo), and the drop in the preceding year had been only $I6,oooooo. And the period
was, relatively speaking, a boom period. See generally Business Week, Feb. 8, 1936, p. 6.
29Even Senator George, opposed as he was to the limitation on refunds, thought the tax
2s49
21

was shifted. He contended, however, that it was shifted not to the consumer but, in reverse,
to the producer by a drop in the price paid by the processor for raw materials. 79 Cong. Rec.,
pt. 10, 11449 (July i9, 1935). See also Seligman, op. cit. supra note 21, at 373, 339. Ezekiel
and Bean, supporting the AAA for the Administration, estimated in 1933 that over 75 per cent
of the tax on cotton could be shifted. Economic Bases for the Agricultural Adjustment Act 6o
(U.S. Dept. of Agric. 1933), quoted in Richards, Cotton under the Agricultural Adjustment
Act ioi (Brookings Institution 1934).
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course even if able to prove that the prices were raised because of the tax, 30
the refunds will prove a windfall to the processors. On the other hand in spite
of any injury to the processors it cannot be denied that the public also "paid"
the tax in increased expenditure and decreased consumption. If the refunds were
enforced, the administration would have to levy new taxes which taxpayers
would again pay. Favorable to the processor is the argument that an administration will not hesitate overmuch to levy unconstitutional taxes if the money
collected need not be returned. A rule which encourages a Congress to disregard the protective clauses of the Constitution is ordinarily to be frowned upon.
Furthermore the courts will hesitate even less than now to enjoin the collection
of doubtful taxes if there is an express condition to refunds, thus preventing
efficient financial administration. Unfavorable, however, is the fact that the
processing taxes were unconstitutional not of themselves, but merely because
they were part of the unconstitutional AAA.3x Processors injured by the tax
and not otherwise by the AAA have no more complaint, really, than any other
taxpayer. And since the government relied upon these taxes in planning its
budget, enforced refunds would prove an unsettling factor in public and private
finance. This argument should not be emphasized too much, but it is given some
force by the popular approval of the New Deal legislative policies manifested
at the November election. After considering all these elements the Supreme
Court might reasonably conclude that the principles upon which the Jefferson
case was decided were sound and are here applicable, and that §§ 21 (d) and 907
are constitutional.
30In Heckman & Co. v. Dawes &Son Co., 12 F. (2d) 154 (App. D.C. 1926), the buyer was
denied recovery because the court refused to admit that the tax was "paid" by anyone except
him who handed the money over to the government, i.e., the seller. Even Wayne County
Prod. Co. v. Duffy-Mott Co., 244 N.Y. 35x, 55 N.E. 669 (1927), frequently cited as contra
to the Heckman case, was strictly limited to cases "where the promise of the buyer is to pay
a stated price and to put the seller in funds for the payment of a tax besides." Otherwise "the
buyer is without remedy .... " Relatively few contracts expressly separated the tax from
the rest of the price, and it was difficult to do so because the tax was not upon sales by unit
but upon a manufacturing operation by volume. But see the uniform contract suggested by
the Millers' National Federation.
31United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 58, 79 (1936).

